Illinois Labor Relations Board has Exclusive Jurisdiction Over Malpractice Claims Against Union-Provided Lawyers

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The Village of Fox Lake (“Village”) sought to terminate the employment of police officer Russell Zander (“Zander”).  At the advice of attorney Roy Carlson (“Carlson”) whose services were provided to him by the Fraternal Order of Police (the “FOP”), Zander waived his right to a hearing before the local police board and chose instead to challenge his dismissal through an arbitration in which Carlson represented him.  When the arbitrator ruled against him, Zander sued Carlson and the FOP for legal malpractice.  The Circuit Court dismissed Zander’s complaint, holding that Carlson was immune from personal liability for actions taken on behalf of a union and that Zander’s claim against the FOP must be brought before the Illinois Labor Relations Board.  Zander appealed.

The Appellate Court of Illinois, First District, affirmed dismissal.  It reiterated the Circuit Court’s holding that “the Labor Relations Act vests the [Illinois Labor Relations] Board with exclusive jurisdiction over claims that a union has violated its duty of fair representation.”  Id. at ¶13.  Similarly, with respect to any personal liability on Carson’s part, the Appellate Court explained that “when a union instead hires an attorney to act for it in the collective bargaining process—including in an arbitration proceeding where the underlying grievance belongs to a particular union member—the union itself continues to represent, and is ultimately responsible to, the member.”  Id. at ¶14.  To hold otherwise, it continued, would be to “hold certain agents or employees of the union to a far higher standard of care than the union itself.”  Id. at ¶15.  Zander countered that he had a direct attorney-client relationship which permitted him to sue Carlson independently.  The Appellate Court rejected this argument as well, saying “to invoke this exception, the union member must show that the attorney specifically agreed to provide direct representation to the union member as an individual client” rather than “acting pursuant to his obligation to provide representation for or on behalf of the union.”  Id. at ¶18.  Zander’s complaint did not allege any specific agreement to that effect.

Zander v. Carlson, 2019 IL App (1st) 181868

(This is for informational purposes and is not legal advice.)

Soverain Software, LLC v. Day, 2017 IL App (1st) 161913-U, appeal denied sub nom. Soverain Software, LLC v. Jones Day, 98 N.E.3d 58 (Ill. 2018)

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This unpublished opinion related to a suit between a former client and a law firm principally centered on past due fees.  The law firm brought a breach of contract claim for $10 million for past due fees and the client counterclaimed for a number of things, including breach of contract and legal malpractice.  The parties arbitrated the dispute and the arbitrator found in favor of the law firm for $1.5 million.  The trial court vacated the arbitration awarded finding that the arbitration panel exceeded its authority and created a compromise award.  The appellate court reversed and affirmed the arbitral award, finding that the award was grounded in the parties’ contract and the trial court improperly imposed its view in place of the arbitral award.

Soverain Software, LLC v. Day, 2017 IL App (1st) 161913-U

(This is for informational purposes and is not legal advice.)

Recent Illinois Case: Short v. Grayson

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The Northern District of Illinois enforced an arbitration clause in an attorney retainer agreement.  In doing so, the Court rejected the plaintiff’s argument that it was against public policy to enforce an arbitration agreement in an attorney retention agreement where the lawyer fails to fully explain the clause.

Short v. Grayson, No. 16 C 2150, 2016 WL 7178463 (N.D. Ill. Dec. 9, 2016)

(This is for informational purposes and is not legal advice.)

Arbitration of Attorney Malpractice Claims

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by Joshua E. Liebman and Alexander L. Berg

Originally published by the ABA Section of Litigation Professional Services Liability Website, June 8, 2016 – ©2016 by the American Bar Association.

Numerous legal malpractice cases were filed against lawyers and law firms in 2015. Several were highly publicized and had large verdicts. See, e.g., Adrianne Appel, “4 Big Malpractice Cases in 2015: From Weird to Wildly Costly,” Bloomberg Law, Dec. 20, 2015. What can a lawyer do (besides providing appropriate legal advice) to keep himself or herself out of the courtroom in a malpractice case? The answer may be to include a provision in the lawyer’s retainer agreement that requires the binding arbitration of malpractice claims. This article explores this course of action and some of the positive and negative aspects of doing so.

The Basics
Most states permit a lawyer to include in his retainer agreement with a client a provision that requires the binding arbitration of malpractice claims (and fee disputes) provided that certain conditions are met. First, the lawyer must fully apprise the client of the advantages and disadvantages of binding arbitration and give the client enough information so that the client can make an informed decision about this issue. Second, the arbitration provision cannot limit the liability to which the lawyer would otherwise be exposed under common or statutory law unless the client is independently represented in making the agreement. While these guidelines generally apply, a lawyer should check state-specific rules and decisions before deciding to include such a provision in a retainer agreement.

In Illinois, for example, where we principally practice, the Rules of Professional Conduct and recent case law have touched on this issue. Illinois Rule of Professional Conduct 1.8(h)(1) states that a lawyer shall not “make an agreement prospectively limiting the lawyer’s liability to a client for malpractice unless the client is independently represented in making the agreement.” Comment 14 to the Rule provides the reasoning for this — noting that such an agreement is “likely to undermine competent and diligent representation.” Further, this comment notes that “many clients are unable to evaluate the desirability of making such an agreement before a dispute has arisen.” The comment also notes that it does not “prohibit a lawyer from entering into an agreement with the client to arbitrate legal malpractice claims, provided such agreements are enforceable and the client is fully informed of the scope and effect of the agreement.” Recent Illinois cases are in accord: Woods v. Patterson Law Firm, P.C., 381 Ill. App. 3d 989, 997 (1st Dist. 2008) (holding that while an arbitration provision related to a malpractice claim was valid, the law firm waived it by actively participating in the discovery process in furtherance of a filed lawsuit), and Davis v. Fenton, 26 F. Supp. 3d 727, 739-40 (N.D. Ill. 2014) (holding that an arbitration clause in the retainer agreement was valid and not substantively unconscionable). In both cases, the courts held that arbitration clauses related to attorney malpractice claims are enforceable in Illinois.

Similarly, the American Bar Association Standing Committee on Ethics and Professional Responsibility issued Formal Opinion 02-425, finding that retainer agreements that require binding arbitration are permissible under the Model Rules of Professional Conduct provided certain conditions are met.

Other courts have found a binding arbitration provision in a retainer agreement unenforceable. Very recently in Batoff v. Widen, No. 02350, the Philadelphia Court of Common Pleas found a retainer agreement’s arbitration clause unenforceable because it was in an addendum attached to the agreement that was not signed or initialed by the client and it did not contain language providing notice of the rights that the client was waiving. The court reached this finding in spite of the client being a sophisticated businessman and former attorney. The Batoff court analyzed two other cases, Sanford v. Bracewell & Guilliani,LLP, 6 F. Supp. 3d 568 (E.D. Pa. 2014) reversed and remanded, 618 F. App’x. 114, 116 (3d Cir. 2015), and Hodges v. Reasonover, 103 So. 3d 1069 (La. 2012), that discussed disclosure requirements for an enforceable arbitration provision. The Hodges court, for example, found that for a binding arbitration provision related to legal malpractice claims to be valid, “[a]t a minimum, the attorney must disclose the following legal effects of binding arbitration, assuming they are applicable:

Waiver of the right to a jury trial;
Waiver of the right to an appeal;
Waiver of the right to broad discovery under the Louisiana Code of Civil Procedure and/or Federal Rules of Civil Procedure;
Arbitration may involve substantial upfront costs compared to litigation;
Explicit disclosure of the nature of claims covered by the arbitration clause, such as fee disputes or malpractice claims;
The arbitration clause does not impinge upon the client’s right to make a disciplinary complaint to the appropriate authorities;
The client has the opportunity to speak with independent counsel before signing the contract.”

Hodges, 103 So. 3d at 1077.

Attorneys who wish to include a binding arbitration provision related to malpractice claims in their retainer agreements should make sure they are fully informing the client of the advantages and disadvantages of binding arbitration and giving the client enough information for the client to make an informed decision.

Insurance Issues
Another important consideration before an attorney decides to include a binding arbitration provision in a retainer agreement is how it may affect his or her malpractice insurance. It is extremely important that an attorney review his or her insurance policy and discusses this issue with the insurer to avoid mistakenly invalidating malpractice coverage. It is also worthwhile to see if the insurer has a position on binding arbitration provisions. Some insurers have issued advisory opinions about this issue that may offer valuable insight to the attorney. It is best practice to get written consent from an insurer before  deciding to include an arbitration clause that covers malpractice claims in a retainer agreement.

Pros and Cons
As with most decisions, there are pros and cons to electing arbitration over traditional litigation. Further complicating the issue, whether a factor is a pro or a con may differ for each attorney or firm. Below we explore the factors that attorneys should consider when weighing whether to include a binding arbitration provision in a retainer agreement.

Private and confidential. Arbitration is private by nature. Thus, it enables lawyers to limit public disclosure of otherwise confidential information when attempting to recover fees or defending malpractice claims. In addition, it protects the law firm’s reputation, which may be damaged immediately upon the public filing of a malpractice suit regardless of the strength of the claim.

Costs. Arbitration, generally, should be less expensive than traditional litigation. Although the parties are required to pay up-front administrative fees and the arbitrator’s (or arbitrators’) hourly rate, the overall cost of arbitration from filing through resolution should be less because discovery and motion practice typically are limited. That being said, if the law firm has a strong dispositive motion to dismiss, it may be less expensive to litigate in court. That is because the arbitrators may prohibit motion practice, preferring to allow all the facts and legal issues to be addressed at trial.

No jury. Binding arbitration avoids the risks associated with a jury trial. Those risks include having the case decided by a jury of unsophisticated individuals who may not understand some of the complex issues that arise in a legal malpractice case. There also is a perception that jurors are predisposed to dislike or distrust attorneys. Thus, as a general rule, a legal malpractice defendant is better off with an arbitrator — typically another lawyer or a former judge — making the final determination as opposed to a jury primarily comprising non-lawyers. On the other hand, because arbitrators are allowed to exercise discretion and do not face substantive appellate review, they may be subject to outside influences or apply principles of equity to reach what they perceive to be a fair resolution.

Input in selecting the arbitrator. In addition to having an attorney or judge make the final determination, arbitration also is beneficial because the defendant attorney will be involved in selecting the arbitrator. This stands in stark contrast to the random appointment of a judge or panel of potential jurors in court. Having input in the selection process enables the parties to attempt to identify an arbitrator with experience handling legal malpractice cases. Of course, the plaintiff also will be involved in selecting the arbitrator and, if the law strongly favors the plaintiff’s case, having an experienced arbitrator may benefit the plaintiff as much, if not more, than the defendant attorney.

Expeditious resolution.
Arbitration will likely be resolved more expeditiously than a court case. For example, according to the 2014 Annual Report of the Illinois Courts, lawsuits seeking jury verdicts in an amount over $50,000 filed in the Circuit Court of Cook County, Chicago, Illinois, on average spanned 37.5 months from complaint to verdict. By contrast, according to the American Arbitration Association (“AAA”) Arbitration Roadmap, a commercial case should take only 297 days from filing to award.

Limited discovery. In arbitrations, discovery usually is limited to document requests exchanged by the parties and a limited number of depositions. Indeed, under the AAA rules, the arbitrator has discretion to direct the parties to exchange documents and identify witnesses. However, the rules do not address any other formal discovery procedures such as interrogatories, requests for admission or depositions. (See AAA Commercial Arbitration Rules and Mediation Procedures R-21.)

No substantive appeal. Parties to an arbitration proceeding do not have any right to a substantive appeal. Indeed, under the Federal Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C. § 1 et seq., a party may appeal an arbitrator’s decision only in the following circumstances:

where the award was procured by corruption, fraud or other undue means;
there was evident partiality or corruption in the arbitrator. . .;
where the arbitrators were guilty of misconduct in refusing to postpone the hearing, upon sufficient cause shown, or in refusing to hear evidence pertinent and material to the controversy; or of any other misbehavior by which the rights of any party have been prejudiced; or
where the arbitrators exceeded their powers, or so imperfectly executed them that a mutual, final, and definite award upon the subject matter submitted was not made.

9 U.S.C.A. § 10.

As a result, an arbitration award is rarely overturned.

Insurance concerns. Finally, before adding an arbitration clause to an engagement letter, attorneys should consider the insurance concerns discussed above.

The inclusion of a binding arbitration provision in a retainer agreement is an almost sure-fire way to keep legal malpractice allegations private and out of the public courtroom setting. Whether the benefit of privacy and the other pros of arbitration outweigh the cons is a conclusion that each law firm must reach on its own after analyzing the rules and case law in the applicable jurisdiction, the requirements of the firm’s malpractice insurance carrier and the factors discussed above.

Joshua E. Liebman and Alexander L. Berg are with Novack and Macey LLP in Chicago, Illinois.

(This is for information purposes and is not legal advice.)

Recent Illinois Case: Conney v. Quarles & Brady LLP

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In this unpublished opinion, the First District affirmed the confirmation of an arbitration award against a law firm. The law firm had agreed to allow its client to select an arbitrator to resolve the parties’ fee dispute and specifically agreed that the client could select one of his other lawyers involved in the underlying case.

After the client selected one of those lawyers to be the arbitrator and the arbitrator ruled against the firm, the firm claimed that the arbitrator was biased. The court held that the firm could not challenge the award based on bias because it knew of the arbitrator’s relationship with the client when it consented to him being an arbitrator.

The court also rejected the law firm’s argument that the arbitrator went beyond arbitrating the fee dispute and considered allegations of negligence.


Conney v. Quarles & Brady LLP, 2016 IL App (1st) 150505-U.

(This is for informational purposes and is not legal advice.)

Mandatory Arbitration Clause Ruled Unenforceable

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Mitchell L. Marinello Jan 2014
Mitchell L. Marinello

by Mitchell L. Marinello

Originally published by the ABA Section of Litigation Alternative Dispute Resolution Website, Practice Points, January 7, 2016 . ©2016 by the American Bar Association.

In an issue of first impression in Pennsylvania, a state court has ruled that the mandatory arbitration clause in Reed Smith’s client engagement letters is unenforceable because it was not specifically signed by the client and did not inform the client of the rights he was giving up and the potential costs he might incur. The court rejected Reed Smith’s argument that the arbitration clause should be enforced because their client was a sophisticated businessman and attorney.

Plaintiff Jerald S. Batoff sued Reed Smith and one of its attorneys for legal malpractice in negotiating a $20.5 million settlement with Batoff’s insurance company after Batoff’s Villanova mansion burned down in April 2012. Batoff alleged that Reed Smith advised him to enter into the settlement without the involvement of the tenants who were living in the home at the time of the fire and who had an option to purchase the home. The lease and option-to-buy agreement required the tenants to be involved in any such negotiations.

Batoff alleged that he incurred more than $500,000 in damages from legal fees he paid in litigation with the tenants plus potentially millions of dollars in additional damages, because the settlement required Batoff to indemnify the insurance company if the tenants sued the insurer, which they did.

In April, Philadelphia Court of Common Pleas Judge John M. Younge denied without explanation Reed Smith’s preliminary objections to Batoff’s suit under the theory that the case was required to be sent to arbitration. In his December 18 opinion, which revisited and expounded on that decision, Younge said the Pennsylvania Supreme Court has yet to weigh in on the issue of attorney-client arbitration agreements. He noted that Pennsylvania Rule of Professional Conduct 1.8 allows such mandatory arbitration agreements if the client is “fully informed of the scope and effect of the agreement,” but found the client was not so fully informed here. With no Pennsylvania case law to rely on, Younge cited a recent Eastern District of Pennsylvania case, Sanford v. Bracewell & Guiliani, which relied on a test outlined by the Louisiana Supreme Court in the case Hodges v. Reasonover, to determine whether an arbitration agreement fully informed the client of the rights being given up by agreeing to arbitration.

The Hodges case stated that clients signing arbitration clauses should be informed they are waiving their right to a jury trial, their right to an appeal, and broad discovery rights, and should also be informed that they could pay substantial upfront costs, could still make a disciplinary complaint against their attorney and could speak with independent counsel before signing the agreement. Hodges also stated that clients should be fully informed of the types of claims that would have to be submitted to arbitration. Applying this law to the facts, Judge Younge stated that:

the defendants were unable to establish that [Batoff] ever read the arbitration clause, or was even aware of its existence, because it was found in an addendum to the engagement letter that was neither signed nor initialed by [Batoff]. Based on the language of the arbitration agreement, the defendants were also unable to establish that [Batoff] was informed of the ramifications and scope of arbitration.

Younge said that Reed Smith’s arbitration clause did not provide any explanation of the rights Batoff was waiving, including his right to a jury trial and his right to engage in full discovery, nor did it inform him that he could face substantial upfront costs. The Court discounted the fact that Batoff was a successful businessman and attorney, noting that Batoff was not licensed to practice law at the time of the engagement and “no proof was presented that he was specialized in contract law or arbitration agreements.” The Court also noted that Batoff did not feel capable of handing the dispute himself which is why he hired defendants to serve as his counsel. The Court said that defendants submitted no law to support their argument that lawyers should face a lower standard of proof about the disclosures they must make when their clients are sophisticated.

(This is for information purposes and is not legal advice.)


Woods v. Patterson Law Firm, P.C., 381 Ill. App. 3d 989, 886 N.E.2d 1080 (1st Dist. 2008)

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Woods v. Patterson Law Firm, P.C., 381 Ill. App. 3d 989, 886 N.E.2d 1080 (1st Dist. 2008)