Rabbi Stanley Kroll (“Kroll”) had an employment contract with his Synagogue which included a deferred compensation retirement plan (the “Plan”). In 2016, the Synagogue asked Kroll to retire early. Kroll agreed, but on his last day a Synagogue officer told him that a tax issue had arisen with the Plan, promising it would be resolved. Kroll found out later that the issue had not been resolved, thereby subjecting his deferred compensation to heavy penalties. Kroll also alleged that the Synagogue had not set aside enough money to fund the Plan and had retained the law firm Cozen O’Connor (“Cozen”) without his knowledge to help it reduce payments to him. Kroll sued the Synagogue, settled, and then sued Cozen. Cozen issued subpoenas “to obtain [Kroll’s] confidential communications with the lawyers who advised or represented him after his departure from the Synagogue.” Id. at 3. It argued that because Kroll had relied on the discovery rule to toll the running of the statute of limitations, he had placed the question of when his claims accrued and when he learned of his injuries at issue. Cozen claimed that this constituted a waiver of the attorney-client privilege and the work-product doctrine as to communications between Kroll and his attorneys that showed when he learned of his injury. Id.
Kroll moved to quash or modify the subpoenas and the Court granted his motion in full. It explained that although the privileged communications sought might address what Kroll knew about his injuries and when, they were not vital to Cozen’s defenses. Id. at 5. The matter was “early in discovery” at the time, and the Court “had no basis to conclude […] that [Kroll’s] privileged communications […] are the only source of evidence about when [Kroll] learned, and what he learned, about the nature of his alleged injuries.” Id. at 5.
(This is for informational purposes and is not legal advice.)