Jeffrey Mandalis (“Mandalis”) sued his former attorneys, David Wentzel and Scott Blake (the “Defendants”), claiming they negligently and fraudulently misrepresented the terms of a settlement agreement in a dispute between several members of Mandalis’ family concerning ownership of certain assets. He also alleged that the Defendants failed to disclose their potentially conflicting representation of his aunt in the same matter, and that they did not inform him when they mediated the family dispute. Further, allegedly without Mandalis’ knowledge, Blake initialed a settlement term sheet that included all of Mandalis’ rights and claims. When Mandalis confronted the Defendants, they supposedly misrepresented the nature of the settlement, saying some of his relatives had agreed to settle only as to their interests, and that he would receive his share of the assets later.
Subsequent mediations were inconclusive, so the Defendants asked Mandalis to agree to a binding mediation- arbitration on October 13, 2013. On October 24, 2013, the Defendants finally informed Mandalis that he should seek separate counsel. Mandalis did so within three days, but alleged that the Defendants continued to mislead him as to his interest in the family assets until eight days before the November 27, 2013 closing date. Despite all, Mandalis attended the closing and signed the closing documents for fear that that further dispute would diminish his share of the assets. He filed his initial complaint in December 2015. The Defendants moved to dismiss his suit as untimely per the two-year statute of limitations and for failure to allege sufficient facts to support his causes of action. The trial court granted the motion. Mandalis moved to reconsider, and appealed when his motion was denied.
The First District affirmed, stating that statutes of limitations do “not require that the injured party have actual knowledge of the alleged malpractice.” Id. at ¶ 43. Rather, “knowledge that an injury has been wrongfully caused does not mean knowledge of a specific defendant’s negligent conduct or knowledge of the existence of a cause of action.” Id. The First District highlighted that “there can be no doubt that the plaintiff actually knew of his injury in March 2013, such that the filing of his complaint against the defendants in December 2015, was barred by the two-year statute of limitations.” Id. at ¶ 47. It clarified that Mandalis “was not only in possession of sufficient information about his injury to be placed on inquiry to determine whether actionable conduct was involved, but in fact had actual knowledge of both the injury and the cause of that injury in March 2013.” Id. Nevertheless, it went on, “[i]f the plaintiff did not actually know of his injury after the March mediation settlement, in the very least, he certainly should have known of it after the entry of the October 13, 2013, binding arbitration award enforcing that settlement.” Id. at ¶ 48. Mandalis countered that, even if he was injured in October 2013, the Defendants tolled the statute of limitations by fraudulently concealing their misconduct. In particular, he claimed the Defendants reassured him that his stated goals remained viable. The First District rejected this argument too. “Contrary to the plaintiff’s position,” it explained, “he nowhere alleged that the defendants failed to disclose any material facts to him.” Id. at ¶ 56. It also pointed out that “the plaintiff admitted that he subsequently participated in the binding arbitration knowing full well that the arbitration award would enforce the terms of that term sheet.” Id.
(This is for informational purposes and is not legal advice.)