Mansour Nasrabadi (“Nasrabadi”) hired attorney Taher Kameli (“Kameli”) to represent him throughout the EB 5 visa process; a program by which a foreign national may obtain permanent U.S. residency upon investing at least $500,000 in a qualifying enterprise. Kameli advised Nasrabadi that investing in the Aurora Fund (the “Fund”), which Kameli owned, would satisfy EB 5 requirements. He explained that the Fund would lend the money to another entity for the construction of an assisted living facility and that Nasrabadi would have a first priority security interest in the facility’s assets and real estate. Nasrabadi agreed, signed a conflict waiver, and gave $500,000 to the Fund by a transaction in which Kameli also represented him.
Nasrabadi later sued for malpractice and breach of fiduciary duty, alleging that Kameli never acquired the promised security interest for his money and that Kameli failed to inform Nasrabadi that his conflicts were unwaivable. Rather, Nasrabadi claimed that Kameli kept his money for personal use and secured a separate first priority mortgage loan to finance the facility. Thus, when the bank holding Kameli’s and the Fund’s first priority loan foreclosed, it had priority over Nasrabadi’s interest.
Kameli moved to dismiss Nasrabadi’s claim for malpractice for being duplicative and untimely. On the matter of duplicity, Kameli cited the rule that “when a breach of fiduciary duty claim is based on the same operative facts as a legal malpractice claim, and results in the same injury, the later claim should be dismissed.” Id. at 3. The Court did not hold that such a rule applied here as it was “not clear at this point in the proceedings whether Kameli’s alleged failure to secure priority for the Fund’s loan to the Facility… can be said to be within the scope of his representation of Nasrabadi.” Id. at 3.
Regarding timeliness, Kameli’s arguments failed as well. There, he asserted that Nasrabadi’s claims were based on the engagement letter signed eight years ago, well outside Illinois’ two-year statute of limitations and six-year statute of repose for legal malpractice. 735 ILCS 5/13-214.3(b); 735 ILCS 5/13-214.3(c). The Court disagreed, stating that “the injury in a legal malpractice action is not the attorney’s negligent act itself” but “the loss for which a client may seek monetary damages.” Id. at 4. However, the alleged injury in this case was the loss of Nasrabadi’s investment, not the signing of the engagement letter. Nasrabadi did not plead facts establishing precisely when that loss took place, but a complaint “does not have to anticipate” the affirmative defense of timeliness. Id. “As long as the Court can imagine a scenario in which the claim is timely,” the Court explained, “it is improper to dismiss it on the pleadings.” Id.
(This is for informational purposes and is not legal advice.)